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Abstract
The present paper examines the historical development in the
structure of the family in terms of marriage, divorce, fertility and la-
bor 1886–2007 in order to map quantitative changes. The paper draws
new information from novel Norwegian data. Along with the chang-
ing family relations we also quantify the closing of the gender gap by
converging trends for both labor participation rates and wages. The
paper concludes that there is a clear correspondence between gender
convergence in the labor market and less stable family relations.
1 Introduction
During the last century the family as social and economic unit has experi-
enced dramatic changes in the way it is organized and structured. 150 years
ago it was common for a Norwegian or say European family to constitute the
core unit both socially and economically. Marriage was the only established
and accepted way of cohabitation. Divorce was extremely rare, fertility rates
were very high. The family provided individuals with the necessary social
network and social security. The family household, i.e. members of a family
living in the same dwelling or related dwellings, in many ways was consid-
ered a production or labor unit. They were together responsible for a labor
supply, which was sufficient to cover necessary expenses for their lives. Since
that time the standard of living has been increasing dramatically. Women
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are more engaged in paid work outside their home and the huge gender gap
in income that existed 150 years ago has come down substantially, and is
nowadays only of a minor significance.
Along with this development the stability of the family is considerably
reduced. Marriage is not longer the only way of organizing the family, as
cohabitation has been common. Divorce rates have rocketed during the last
decades and fertility has dropped considerable, the number of provoked abor-
tions and out of wedlock births have increased substantially. This has hap-
pened despite of considerable research showing that stable family life has a
significant positive impact on the individual not only as a child but also later
in life. For example family size, birth order and parents education influence
children’s acquisition of human capital and women taking longer education
tends to delay their first birth. A shock to the family, for example a divorce,
affects not only the parents but also the children in the family in the form of
both financial and personal distress. For the society at large, family struc-
ture and stability affects for example the labor force participation rate and
the financing and costs of social security services.
Modern economic theories of the family started with Becker’s 1981 book
A Treatise on the Family.1 However, as Ermish points out, family economics
can be traced back to “Thomas Malthus [who] believed that human fertil-
ity was determined by the age at marriage and frequency of coition during
marriage. He contended that an increase in people’s income would encour-
age them to marry earlier and have sexual intercourse more often.”2 Thus,
fertility rates would increase.
In this paper we set out to describe aspects of the family structure in
Norway from the last part of the nineteenth century until present, in order
to quantify how this structure have changed over time and how the family
interact with the labor market. In particular, we analyze five time series and
the interaction between them. These series are the marriage rate, the divorce
rate, the birth rate, the female labor force participation rate and the female
to male wage ratio.
1Becker, Gary S. (1981): A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press.
2Ermisch, John (2008): Family Economics. In Durlauf, Steven N. and Blume, Lawrence
E., editors: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online, Palgrave Macmillan. 31 July 2008,
DOI:10.1057/9780230226203.0550.
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2 The trends
In this section we examine the trends in marriages, divorces, birth rates
(fertility), female-male wage ratios and female labor participation rates for
Norway 1886 to 2007. The first three of these time series picture dramatic
changes in the Norwegian family structure, while the two latter time series
describe large changes in women’s economic lives and dependency.
2.1 Data sources
The data on family structure are basically drawn from Statistics Norway.
In their historical statistics we find excellent data on births, marriages and
divorces from 1769 and onwards. It is also possible to find older data in
less available publications and unpublished archival sources. We basically
compile these data from Statistics Norway’s own historical statistics, which
is partly published in printed series and partly electronically.3 The data are
compiled on the basis of registrations of births, marriages and divorces done
by clergy and public records offices in all municipalities in the country and
are very reliable indeed.
The data on labor participation rates are also basically drawn from Statis-
tics Norway. For most of the post World War II period these data are easily
drawn from data published by the bureau.4 For the pre-war period, how-
ever, it is not a straightforward task to come up with stringent time series.
In the first place, one has to adjust the labor force data collected at the
population censuses taken every tenth year according to modern definitions
of labor force participation. Secondly, one has to arrive at annual data by
interpolation between the modified census data. This is done by using an-
nual demographic, employment and unemployment data. These are available
partly from Statistics Norway and partly from previous research.5
Finally, wage data are basically taken from a project on historical mone-
tary statistics monitored by the Norwegian central bank. Here we find wage
series by occupation, by industry and on aggregated levels.6 As part of the
3NOS 1969, Historical Statistics 1968, Statistics Norway, Oslo, pp. 42-47,
NOS 1978, Historical Statistics 1978, Statistics Norway, Oslo, pp. 44-49,
NOS 1994, Historical Statistics 1994, Statistics Norway, Oslo, pp. 63-71 and
URL: http://ssb.no/emner/02/02/folkendrhist/tabeller/
4NOS 1994, Historical Statistics 1994, Statistics Norway, Oslo, pp. 229-230 and
URL: http://ssb.no/aku/tab-2009-01-28-01.html
5Grytten, Ola Honningdal (1994): An Empirical Analysis of the Norwegian Labour
Market, 1918–1939, NHH, Bergen, pp. 130-131.
6Grytten, Ola Honningdal (2007): Nominal wages in Norway by occupation 1726-1940,
Eitrheim, Øyvind et al (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics, Part II, Norges Bank, Oslo,
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occupational wage series we also find annual data sets for wages by gender
from 1820 onwards. These series are basically constructed with data from
the Professor Dr. Ingvar B. Wedervang’s Archive on Historical Wages and
Prices (until 1940) and data from Statistics Norway (chiefly from 1920).7 The
Wedervang Archive, kept at the Norwegian School of Economics and Busi-
ness Administration in Bergen, is one of the richest manual archives on prices
and wages for nineteenth century Europe. However, it also holds significant
numbers of observations from the seventeenth and eighteenth century. All in
all, some million observations on prices and wages 1641–1940 are kept in the
records.
The archive was established by Professor Ingvar B. Wedervang in cooper-
ation with Professor Ragnar Frisch, both from the Department of Economics
at Oslo University in the 1930s. Some 40 part and full time staff assisted in
collecting data from public and private records nationwide during the first
decade of its existence. The price data are considered very good and reliable
from 1815, when the wage data are considered good from 1820 and very good
from 1850.8
Here we are able to split between female and male wages in agriculture,
domestic services and some manufacturing industries 1820–1850. The gender
specific data are richer from 1850, as they include additional private services
and most manufacturing industries. The coverage increases towards 1940,
and after World War II they represent gender specific wage data from most
occupations and industries.
2.2 Decomposition of the time series
To estimate the trend we have decomposed the time series into a trend and
a cyclical component using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The HP-filter
is an algorithm for finding smoothed values, i.e., trends of a time series. The
filter separates an observed time series, {yt}Tt=1, into a smoothed or a trend
pp. 231–342 and
Grytten, (Ola Honningdal 2007): Norwegian wages 1726-2006 classified by industry,
Eitrheim, Øyvind et al (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics, Part II, Norges Bank, Oslo,
pp. 343–384.
7Grytten, Ola Honningdal (2007): Nominal wages in Norway by occupation 1726-1940,
Eitrheim, Øyvind et al (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics, Part II, Norges Bank, Oslo,
pp. 271–342.
8Grytten, Ola Honningdal (2007): Professor Dr Ingvar B Wedervang’s Historical
Archive on Wages and Prices, Eitrheim, Øyvind et al (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics,
Part II, Norges Bank, Oslo, pp. 203–230.
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component, gt, and a cyclical component, ct. That is,
yt = gt + ct. (1)
In the filtering (detrending) of yt, the trend component gt is determined by
min
T∑
t=1
(yt − gt)2 + λ
T−1∑
t=2
[(gt+1 − gt)− (gt − gt−1)]2. (2)
Here T is the sample size and λ is the smoothing parameter, specifying the
smoothness of the trend. A normal value for λ is 100 for annual data, 1600
for quarterly and 14400 for monthly, depending on the use of the data. Thus,
we apply λ = 100 in our analysis.
2.3 Changing family structure
In order to investigate the impact of changes in the economic life and the
labor market on marriage, divorce and fertility it is important to examine
structural changes in the family as an socio-economic institution. Norwegian
archival sources on wages very much reflect the family as an economic unit
throughout the last centuries.
By looking at wage records from two of the pioneer industrial plants in
Norway, the Baasland and Næs iron mill (from 1726) and Alvøen paper mill
(from 1797) we find that the labor force was basically connected to the com-
panies by individual contracts. These were chiefly made between the manager
of the plant and the bread-winners of the household. Wages were paid both
as a cash component, but also in natura, i.e. housing and subsidized food
and clothing. This was representative for manufacturing plants, agriculture
and to a large extent crafts and construction. The payment was dependent
on the labor effort of the family household. The employers often demanded
work from both parents and the children able to work on the plant. The
families were paid both according to their total working capacity and their
need for life support. In other words, the employers considered the family
both as a labor unit and an economic and social unit.9
This pattern was significant until the mid-19th century, and still remained
strong at the end of the nineteenth century, despite that the individual labor
contract had become dominant at that time. One example can be taken
from one of the foremost textile companies in Norway, O.A. Devold, formally
9Fløystad, Ingeborg (1979): Arbeidsmandens Lod, det nødtøftige Brød: Arbeiderlevek˚ar
ved Baaseland and Næs Jernverk 1725–1807. University of Bergen, Bergen, pp. 595-596.
Goksøyr, Matti (1982): Fra tjener til arbeider? En undersøkelse av Alvøen-arbeidernes
rekruttering og lønnsforhold 1801–1865. University of Bergen, Bergen, pp. 7-61.
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founded in 1853, but with roots from 1818. The company was funded by
Christian puritans, which was very common for companies in the Western
world, also in Norway. Devold was a pioneer company internationally within
production technology, hydro-electricity, telecommunication, wool products,
health, and labor welfare and community building. As late as in the middle
of the twentieth century, they still considered the families of their labor force
as their responsibility, building kinder gardens, granting scholarships for sons
and daughters of their employees, building the local hospital, church, mission
hall and dwellings for their working force and their families. On the other
hand the family households stayed faithful to the company, and its work force
was recruited internally.
During the inter-war crises of the economy the old system of considering
the family household as the basic labor force and economic unit had a short
revival generally, before it ceased after World War II.10
Marriage Historically, marriage was a contract between a man and a
woman, which had important economic, social and juridical implications.11
Quite often the marriage contracts were set up by others than the two indi-
viduals. According to Coontz p. 145 it was not until the end of the 1700s
that in Europe “personal choice of partners had replaced arranged marriage
as a social ideal, and individuals were encouraged to marry for love.” This
is for example reflected in the historical practice that clergy and other civil
servants often had to marry the widows of their predecessors.
From a neoclassical economic view the benefit from marriage is increased
specialization. The woman staying at home (at least traditionally) and the
husband working outside the home. This specialization has potentially huge
productivity effects, which will increase the family’s economic well-being.
Other economic explanations for marriage, and in broader sense the family,
are economics of scale, public goods, risk pooling and credit and coordination
of investment activities.12 On the personal level, there are of course other
benefits to marriage. For example, married people have better health, lower
risk of mortality at any point in life, more pleasure, higher wages and better
10Lerheim, Kr (1952): Historikk - Devold, Manuscript, A˚lesund, pp. 1-86 and Weder-
vang Archive, file 417.
11Coontz, Stephanie (2005): Marriage, a History. Penguin Books.
12Blau, Francine D., Ferber, Marianne A. and Winkler, Anne E. (2006): The Economics
of Women, Men, and Work. 5th edition. Pearson Prentice Hall.
Weiss, Yoram (1997): The Formation and Dissolution of Families: Why Marry? Who
Marries Whom? and What Happens upon Divorce? In Rosenzweig, Mark R. and Stark,
Oded, editors: Handbook of Population and Family Economics. Volume 1A, Elsevier.
North Holland. Chapter 3, pp. 81–123.
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private economy.13 From this is seems clear that marriage has a positive
effect on well-being. However, the direction of the casaulity is not entirely
clear.
Figure 1 shows the trend in the birth, marriage and divorce rates in
Norway from 1886 to 2007. The numbers are quoted as percentage of the
annual mean population. The number of marriages was relatively stable with
about six marriages per 1,000 inhabitants until the mid 1930s. From then
on there was a sharp increase of about 35% to 1950. However, looking at the
raw data (the data before applying the HP filter) there was a sharp decline
in marriages during World War II. Surprisingly, this decline was reversed
during a few years after World War II. Then the trend is significantly negative
with a few exceptions only. Today, we have about five marriages per 1,000
inhabitants annually. Hence, the fall in the number of marriages is not very
large looking at the entire time period from 1886 to 2007. Having said that,
it should be noted, as already stated, that the trend since 1950 is clearly
negative.
Men were historically and still are normally older when entering into their
first marriage than women. This has been a stable pattern throughout the
period of investigation here. Until around 1920 the average age was about
28-29 years for men and 26-27 years for women. Then it started to increase
until 1946 when the average age was about 29 for men and 26.5 years for
women. After 1936 it dropped considerably until 1970 when the average age
had come down to 26 and 23. Since then, average age at first marriage has
increased steadily and has reached approximately 32.5 for men and 29.5 years
for women. In other words, men are today about four years older and women
about three years older when entering into their first marriage compared to
150 years ago. The age difference between men and women when entering
into their first marriage is today about three years, which is about one year
increase since 1850.
13Waite, Linda J. (1995): Does Marriage Matter? Demography, 32, Nr. 4, pp. 483–507.
Stutzer, Alois and Frey, Bruno S. (2006): Does Marriage Make People Happy, or do
Happy People Get Married? The Journal of Socio-Economics, 35, pp. 326–347.
Zimmermann, Anke C. and Easterlin, Richard A. (2006): Happily Ever After? Cohabi-
tation, Marriage, Divorce and Happiness in Germany.Population and Development Review,
32, Nr. 3, pp. 511–528.
Mastekaasa, Arne (1995): Age Variations in the Suicide Rates and Self-Reported Subjec-
tive Well-Being of Married and Never Married Persons. Journal of Community & Applied
Social Psychology, 5, No. 1, pp. 21–39.
Frey, Bruno S. and Stutzer, Alois (2002): Happiness and Economics. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
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Figure 1: Birth, marriage and divorce rates (HP-filtered with λ = 100).
The rates are defined as births, marriages and divorces as percentages of the
population.
Divorce Divorce tends to rise when the traditional division of labor is
weak, that is, the gains from one specializing in domestic production and the
other person working outside the household are small. Since World War II
women have experienced the possibility of higher education and work outside
the home, and as such, women’s outside possibilities are larger than before,
making it easier for them to break out of marriage. Hence, the costs associ-
ated with marital dissolution are smaller than before, at least, in economic
terms. But the probability of divorce also depends on other factors. Weiss
and Willis show that an unexpected increase in the husband’s earning capac-
ity reduces the probability of a divorce, while an unexpected increase in the
wife’s earning capacity raises the divorce probability.14 Further, sorting into
marriage on the basis of educational attainment at the point of marriage,
similarity in religion and ethnicity, reduce the probability of divorce.15
Before 1900 divorce was practically non existing. In fact, it was not until
about 1970 that there was one divorce per 1,000 inhabitants annually. In
Norway there has been a steady increase in divorces as showed in Figure 1.
14Weiss, Yoram and Willis, Robert J. (1997): Match Quality, New Information and
Marital Dissolution. Journal of Labor Economics, 15, No. 1, Part 2, pp. S293–S329.
15Weiss, Yoram (1997): The Formation and Dissolution of Families: Why Marry? Who
Marries Whom? and What Happens upon Divorce? In Rosenzweig, Mark R. and Stark,
Oded, editors: Handbook of Population and Family Economics. Volume 1A, Elsevier.
North Holland. Chapter 3, pp. 81–123.
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Since 1970 the increase has been stronger than in earlier time periods. The
number of divorces per 1,000 people is today approximately 2.5 per annum,
that is, about half of the number of marriage conducted annually. This
is also confirmed in Figure 2a which shows the divorce rate defined as the
number of divorces divided by the number of marriages in a given year. The
divorce rate has had a steady increase since 1970 with a peak around 1990.
Thereafter it decreased until the late 1990s due to less frequent marriages
and an increasing number of cohabitations not covered by the statistics. In
the 1990 the relative number of divorces started to raise again.
Figure 2b shows that there are large cohort effects with respect to di-
vorces.16 There is an unambiguous trend that the cumulative share of mar-
riages that end in divorce increases with younger cohorts. This clearly shows
that marriages are becoming less stable. Further, not only do younger cohorts
divorce more frequently, but they also divorce earlier, i.e., they are married
fewer years before terminating their marriage compared to older cohorts.
Overall, the trends in Figures 1, 2a and 2b are unambiguously: marriages
are slowly declining and divorces are increasing rapidly, implying that other
types of commitments between two people, for example cohabitation, are
preferred before marriage, and, additionally, if two people are married the
threshold for breaking the marriage is lower compared to earlier times.
Fertility Today it is more than ever a choice for a woman or a couple to
have children since the separation between sex and childbearing is stronger
than ever before. Hence, it is appropriate to talk about the demand for chil-
dren. Already Thomas Malthus in his Essay on the Principle of Population
in 1798 analyzed the population dynamics within an economic framework.
Becker’s paper from 1960 is the first analysis within a neoclassical economics
framework.17 Children are associated with providing utility for their parents,
income and costs. Further, the parents must make a trade-off between the
quantity (how many children) and the quality of children (benefits). More
children means less resources per child for a given basket of resources.
Figure 1 shows the birth rate in Norway from 1886 to 2007 and Figure
3a shows the total fertility rate from 1846 to 2005.18 From the beginning
16Cohort refers here to the year a couple enter into marriage. The source for the figure
is Mamelund, Svenn-Erik, Brunborg, Helge and Noack, Turid (1997): Divorce in Norway
1886–1995 by Calendar Year and Marriage Cohort. Report no. 97/19 Statistics Norway.
17Becker, Gary S. (1960): An Economic Analysis of Fertility. In Demographic and
Economic Change in Developed Countries. Princeton University Press for the National
Bureau of Economic Research, pp. 209–231.
18Total fertility rate is by Statistics Norway defined as: “The average number of live-
born children born to a woman passing through the child-bearing period exposed at each
10
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of the period and until present there has been a sharp decline in the birth
rates from around 3.1% to 1.25%. From the beginning of 1900 until the
1930s there was a sharp decline in the fertility rate from around 4.5 to less
than 2 live-born children born to a woman passing through the child-bearing
period. The fertility rate increased rapidly from the end of World War II to
the beginning of the 1970s (baby boom), when it started to decrease again
and it is now approximately 1.8 child per woman. This is smaller than the
reproduction rate of 2.1 child per woman, but significantly higher than the
rate for average Europe, which is about 1.5.
The transition from high to low levels of fertility and mortality is ex-
plained by the “theory of the demographic transition”:
“Socioeconomic forces are seen to play a central role in this
process: urbanization, the movement of work outside the home,
increased population mobility, the increased importance of the
nuclear family, the increased importance of education and hu-
man capital, declining infant and child mortality, changing roles
of women, and increased rationality in individual and family de-
cision making.”19
Until 1960 about seven percent of all children were born outside a mar-
riage. After 1960 this percentage has increased dramatically. Today, only
half of all children born in Norway are born by parents who are married,
see Figure 3b which shows the ratio of children born out-of-wedlock and the
total number of children born in a given year.
2.4 The converging economic lives of men and women
After having quantified the development of marriage, divorce and fertility
we are in a position to compare the development in these variables against
labor market statistics, i.e. participation rates and gender specific wage
ratios, i.e. female to male wage ratios. Relevant questions would be: did
female participation rates increase? Was the gender gap in terms of wages
closed? If the answer on these two questions are both yes, women became
more independent of male bread-winners. If this development correlates with
the trends in family structure, this can naturally be taken as indication of
more fragile family relations along with the trend that women become less
economic dependent on their spouse.
age to the existing fertility but not exposed to mortality. Total of one-year age-specific
fertility rates 15-49 years.”
19Haines, Michael (2003): Fertility. In Mokyr, Joel, editor: The Oxford Encyclopedia of
Economic History. Volume 2, Oxford University Press, pp. 284–291.
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The labor force participation rate According to Figure 4a the female
labor force participation rate showed a minor increasing trend until the turn
of the nineteenth century when it fluctuated around 54 per cent for women
beteween 15 and 74, against 90 per cent or higher for men. This came as
a consequence of the relatively rapid industrialization process in Norway at
the time, when more women were involved in manufacturing. The fastest
growing female intensive sub-industries were among others food processing
and textile.
From the turn of the century the participation rate for women started to
decrease significantly. This can basically be explained by the rapid produc-
tivity growth in agriculture, causing the labor force in this industry to fall
rapidly. Thus, many women went out of the labor force, when most men
remained in the labor force. The development was speeded up during the
unemployment crisis of the interwar period, when women were forced out of
the labor market due to political decrees by the labor party backed by the
trade unions in order to give priority to male bread-winners before dependent
married women in job application processes. In local boroughs governed by
the social democrats married men were given priority to married women in
the public sector.20 This attitude was also mirrored in the private sector. At
the end of the 1930s the female labor participation rate fell to well 42 per
cent per cent against close to 87 per cent for men between 15 and 74 years.
During the German occupation 1940–1945 lack of labor force again made
the participation rate to increase, before steady economic growth and im-
provement in the standard of living after the war made more women enter
the role as housewives, considered a status symbol for a family until the
1960s. Thus female participation rates reached an all-time low 36 per cent.21
From the middle of that decade, modern feminism and rapid increase in de-
mand for labor caused female participation rates increase dramatically until
present days. In 2008 they were over 70 per cent for women and more than
77 per cent for men.
In other words, we see a dramatic movement towards labor force partici-
pation in Norway from the middle of the 1960 onwards, due to less participa-
tion by men and substantially higher participation by women. In addition,
in Figure 4b we draw the estimated cycle deviations from HP-filtered labor
participation rate-series. The chart informs us that the female labor force
participation rate fluctuated significantly more among women then among
men and was considerably more sensitive to business cycles. An implication
20Grytten, Ola Honningdal and Camilla Brautaset (2000): Family households and un-
employment in Norway during years of crises, The History of the Family, no 1, pp. 23–53.
21Hodne, Fritz and Ola Honningdal Grytten (2002): Norsk økonomi i det 20. a˚rhundre,
Fagbokforlaget, pp. 198-199.
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of this is that female labor participation historically fell more than the cor-
responding male labor participation during years of crises in the economy.
However this difference of pattern seem to have been wiped out during the
last 15–20 years.
The female-male wage ratio Polynomial trends of the female to male
wage ratios are plotted in Figure 4c. They are calculated as female wages as
shares of male wages for similar occupations within industries. As shown in
the graph the gender gap was closed almost persistently. The only exception
was during the years of devastating crises in the economy in the 1920s and
1930s, when the development was temporarily reversed.
Obviously, the substantial interwar crisis in the labor market did not only
force women to give way to male bread-winners in the labor market, but also,
wage differences did increase significantly. This development took place after
a period of rapid decrease in the gender wage differences during the postwar
World War I boom.22 Thus, the divergence trend during most of the 1920s
and 1930s can be seen not only as a result of years of crises, but also as
a consequence of very high convergence rates during the economic upturn
before the interwar crises.
From 1940 onwards the HP-filtered series of female to male wage ratios
have increased rapidly until present days, when the gender differences have
come down to about ten percent, compared to about 55 per cent in the 1880s.
In order to close the last part of the gap, women have to more often enter
senior positions than they have had the opportunity and have been willing to
do up until now. Anyway, the development during the last 120 years clearly
tells us that women have become less economic dependent on husbands, and
can nowadays afford to carry family responsibilities on their own shoulders,
contrary to their abilities in the nineteenth and well into the second part of
the twentieth century.
Summing up the descriptive analysis From the above descriptive anal-
ysis we can conclude: historically the divorce rate has been increasing and
the fertility rate declining significantly for almost all periods since the late
nineteenth century. Marriage rates have been declining substantially during
the last four decades, due to the new trend of cohabitation. The female la-
bor participation rate was decreasing until 1960, and has thereafter shown
22Grytten, Ola Honningdal (2007): Nominal wages in Norway by occupation 1726–1940,
Eitrheim, Øyvind et al (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics, Part II, Norges Bank, Oslo,
pp. 271–342.
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Figure 4: The changing economic lives of women.
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rapid growth. The purchasing powers between men and women have been
converging as measured by the ratio of female to male wages.
In the rest of this paper we focus on the divorce and birth rates on one
side and the female labor participation rate and the female and male wage
ratio on the other side. In addition to analyzing the whole time span we
also look at a sub-sample covering the years 1945 to 2007 when most of the
dramatic changes in family structure and labor market gender convergence
took place. From looking at the above graphs there seems to be shifts in
trends relatively close to 1945. Formally, the Zivot and Andrews test as
described in the next section identifies structural breaks within plus / minus
30 years from 1945. The time around World War II in many ways seem to
mark a change of paradigms both in family life and in the gender specific
wage gap.
3 Unit roots and cointegration
3.1 Unit root
It is not uncommon for a time series to be nonstationary. A nonstationary
time series {yt} do not have the properties of time invariant first and second
moments, i.e., the mean E(yt) and variance V ar(yt) is not constant. An-
other important property with a stationary time series is that the covariance
Cov(yt, yt±s) between two time periods t and s depends on the time period
between them s and not on the actual time t that the covariance is com-
puted. Investigating possible relationships between two nonstationary time
series may lead to results that are spurious.
Looking at the time series in Figure 5 it seems plausible that the variables
in levels are nonstationary when the first differences seem to be stationary. To
formally test for a unit root we employ the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF)
test.23 The number of lags is chosen as the highest significant lag out of a
maximum of five lags. The test statistics are reported in Table 1. For the
years 1886–2007, the test statistic for the birth, divorce and participation
rate is larger than the critical values, hence we are not able to reject the null
hypothesis on nonstationarity. Wages are barely significant at a 10% level.
Overall, the evidence supporting stationarity is weak and we conclude that
the time series are not stationary in levels. But, from the same table it is
clear that the times series are stationary in first differences. Hence, all four
23Most estimations is this paper is computed using the statistical package gretl 1.7.5
(Gnu Regression, Econometrics and Time-series Library). In addition we use Stata 10.1
(mainly for the Zivot and Andrews test) and for graphics we use gnuplot 4.2.
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time series are integrated of order 1, I(1). For the sub-sample period, i.e.
1945–2007, this conclusion still holds.
A weakness with the ADF test is that it does not allow for any structural
breaks in the series. To allow for this we apply the Zivot and Andrews
test procedure24 as implemented in the zandrews command for Stata by
Christopher F. Baum.25 The Zivot and Andrews test allows for one structural
break in the time series. The break can be in the intercept, the trend or both.
We test for all three types of breaks, and the results are reported in table
2. The test results give the same overall conclusion as for the ADF. That is,
the time series in levels are nonstationary.
3.2 Cointegration
Having established that all four time series are integrated of order 1, I(1),
it is natural to ask if there exists any long term equilibrium relationship
between the two series. Or is there a spurious relationship only? In order
to answer this we examine if the time series are cointegrated, i.e., if the
series share a common stochastic trend. To formally test for this we apply
the Johansen cointegration test. In the test we apply a two time period
lag for the sample and one lag for the sub-sample, and in both cases we
use an unrestricted constant allowing for a linear time trend in the levels
of the data. Optimal lag structure is determined by looking at the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwartz Bayesian criterion (BIC) and the
Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC) estimated in a Vector Autoregressive (VAR)
model framework. For both the full sample and the sub-sample all three
information criteria give the same conslusion, i.e. they have their minimum
value at the same length of lags. Table 3 presents the results for both the
trace and maximum eigenvalue test statistics.
We start by considering the full sample. The trace statistics reject the
null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector with a test statics of 52.303 which
is larger than the 5% critical value of 47.21. But, we are not able to reject the
null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is a most one. Hence,
based on the Johansen trace statistics there exists one cointegrating vector.
Turning to the maximum eigenvalue statistic, we see that the hypothesis
stating no cointegrating vector is rejected. The test statistic for the null that
there is at most one cointegrating vector and the alternative that there is two
24Zivot, Eric and Andrews, Donald W. K. (1992): Further evidence on the great crash,
the oil-price shock, and the unit-root hypothesis. Journal of Business & Economic Statis-
tics, 10, Nr. 3, pp. 251–270.
25Baum, Christopher F. (2001): Stata: The language of choice for time series analysis?
The Stata Journal, No. 1, pp. 1–16.
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Table 1: Unit root tests.
Variable ADF Critical values Asymptotic
1% 5% 10% p-value
Years 1886–2007
Birth −2.29412 (5) −4.035 −3.448 −3.148 0.43660
Divorce −1.59041 (1) −4.033 −3.447 −3.147 0.79710
Wages −3.16415 (3) −4.034 −3.448 −3.148 0.09174
Participation −0.30368 (1) −4.033 −3.447 −3.147 0.99060
D.Birth −3.89845 (4) −2.598 −1.950 −1.611 0.00000
D.Divorce −6.80764 (1) −2.597 −1.950 −1.611 0.00000
D.Wages −5.15995 (5) −2.598 −1.950 −1.611 0.00000
D.Participation −5.72128 (0) −2.597 −1.950 −1.611 0.00000
Years 1945–2007
Birth −1.67691 (5) −4.168 −3.508 −3.185 0.7617
Divorce −1.62408 (0) −4.168 −3.508 −3.185 0.7723
Wages −2.42625 (1) −4.168 −3.508 −3.185 0.3657
Participation −2.89491 (1) −4.168 −3.508 −3.185 0.1641
D.Birth −2.28547 (5) −2.616 −1.950 −1.610 0.0215
D.Divorce −4.52567 (1) −2.616 −1.950 −1.610 0.0000
D.Wages −5.09153 (0) −2.616 −1.950 −1.610 0.0000
D.Participation −3.34687 (0) −2.616 −1.950 −1.610 0.0012
Notes: ADF = Augmented Dicky-Fuller test. Number of lags in parenthesis is
chosen as the highest significant lag out of a maximum of 5 lags. The test
includes a constant and a trend. In first differences there are no constant and no
trend included.
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Table 2: Zivot and Andrews unit root test.
Variable Break t-statistic Break year Critical values
1% 5%
Birth intercept −4.099 (3) 1921 −5.43 −4.80
Divorce intercept −4.727 (1) 1973 −5.43 −4.80
Wages intercept −4.549 (3) 1925 −5.43 −4.80
Participation intercept −3.660 (1) 1975 −5.43 −4.80
Birth trend −3.845 (3) 1928 −4.93 −4.42
Divorce trend −2.249 (1) 1953 −4.93 −4.42
Wages trend −4.063 (3) 1941 −4.93 −4.42
Participation trend −4.666 (1) 1958 −4.93 −4.42
Birth both −5.384 (3) 1942 −5.57 −5.08
Divorce both −2.887 (1) 1973 −5.57 −5.08
Wages both −4.573 (3) 1931 −5.57 −5.08
Participation both −4.247 (1) 1956 −5.57 −5.08
Notes: Number of lags in parenthesis is chosen as the highest significant lag out
of a maximum of 5 lags.
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Table 3: Johansen cointegration test.
H0 H1 Test statistic 1% 5% p-value Eigenvalue
Years 1886–2007
Trace statistic
r = 0 r ≥ 1 52.303 54.46 47.21 0.0166 0.21042
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 23.952 35.65 29.68 0.2091 0.12712
r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3 7.6371 20.04 15.41 0.5120 0.055385
r ≤ 3 r ≥ 4 0.79979 6.65 3.76 0.3712 0.0066428
Maximum eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 28.351 32.24 27.07 0.0364 0.21042
r ≤ 1 r = 2 16.314 25.52 20.97 0.2153 0.12712
r ≤ 2 r = 3 6.8373 18.63 14.07 0.5169 0.055385
r ≤ 3 r = 4 0.79979 6.65 3.76 0.3712 0.0066428
Years 1945–2007
Trace statistic
r = 0 r ≥ 1 59.326 54.46 47.21 0.0024 0.44106
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 22.678 35.65 29.68 0.2708 0.17064
r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3 10.890 20.04 15.41 0.2220 0.13101
r ≤ 3 r ≥ 4 2.0435 6.65 3.76 0.1529 0.03192
Maximum eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 36.648 32.24 27.07 0.0016 0.44106
r ≤ 1 r = 2 11.788 25.52 20.97 0.5806 0.17064
r ≤ 2 r = 3 8.8464 18.63 14.07 0.3062 0.13101
r ≤ 3 r = 4 2.0435 6.65 3.76 0.1529 0.03192
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cointegrating vectors is not rejected. Hence, both the trace and maximum
eigenvalue test statistics give the same conclusion. Examining the trace and
maximum eigenvalue statistics for the sub-sample, we conclude that there is
one cointegrating vector for the years 1945 to 2007.
Since both the full sample and the sub-sample have a cointegrating vector
we can estimate a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model with one cointegrat-
ing relationship in the specification. However, for both samples we are not
as interested in the parameter estimates as in the ability to estimate the
Impulse Response Functions (IRF).
4 Impulse response functions
The impulse response functions show how the variables within a system react
to a one-standard-deviation innovation (shock) in one equation at time t,
while there are no innovations in the other variables at time t. The left
column in Figure 6 shows the IRFs for the full sample (1886–2007) while the
right column shows for the sub-sample (1945–2007).
The two top figures show the response of the female labor participation
rate to an innovation in the female to male wage ratio, the birth rate and
the divorce rate. Comparing the full sample with the sub-sample we observe
that the effects of the innovations are quite the opposite. For the sub-sample,
an innovation in the female to male wage ratio increases the female labor
participation rate. When women’s wages increase, their incentives to work
increase. Or, the costs of not working become higher. Hence, this response is
as expected and is in line with the standard view in the economics literature.
The participation rate also increases if there is an innovation in the divorce
rate. A divorced woman who in her marriage has been financially dependent
on her husband must after a divorce generate income on her own. In other
words, she will join the labor force. However, the increase in the participation
of an innovation in the divorce rate is not as large as the effect of a shock in
the female to male wage ratio. An increase in the birth rate will, as expected,
decrease the female labor participation rate.
The impulse response functions for the birth rate show that an increase
in the female to male wage ratio has an initial positive effect on the birth
rate in the first two periods. Then the effect becomes negative as we would
expect. In fact, for the years 1945–2007 the effects start off and remain
negative. An innovation in the female labor participation rate decrease the
birth rate, but only temporarily for the whole time span. For the sub-sample
there is a permanent negative effect of participation rate on the birth rate,
while there is more or less no effect of shocks in the divorce rate. Both
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions for the full sample 1886–2007 (left
column) and the sub-sample 1945–2007.
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the female participation rate and the wage ratio between women and men
have a negative effect on the birth rate. This is not surprising since better
conditions in the labor market increase the costs of not taking advantage of
higher pay. In other words, the cost of having children measured in foregone
income increases.
When women get larger economic freedom measured as their wages rela-
tive to men, the divorce rate increases. And the increase is permanent, but
with a decreasing rate. When women enter the labor market it seems to
stabilize the marriage, i.e. the divorce rate decreases. However, this is only
partial true for the full sample where this effect is vanished after one period
and the divorce rate is increasing because of a innovation in the female par-
ticipation rate. For the years 1945–2007, innovations in the birth rate also
tend to reduce the divorce rate.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
Most writers on family history would agree that converging wages and higher
female labor participation rates along with a more generous welfare system
has contributed to significant changes in the family structure, e.g. lower birth
and fertility rates and more frequent divorces. This paper tries to quantify
these historical changes for Norway from the late 1800s until present days.
This is done by calculations on the basis of family and labor force data from
Statistics Norway and new wage data put together as part of the historical
monetary statistics project ran by the central bank.
We quantify that the family structure has changed dramatically when it
comes to marriage, divorce and fertility. We also give evidence of the magni-
tude of labor participation rate and wage convergence between genders. For
the entire period we find that birth rates fell along with increasing standards
of living and the closing of the gender wage gap. We also find that divorce
rates increased along this development in the labor market. The development
speeded up after World War II. Increasing female labor participation rates
from the mid 1960s also gave fuel to the development towards lower fertility
rates and less stable family relations.
It is also interesting to note that the effects of the demographic changes
in family structure seem to be smaller for the recent time period than they
are in the full sample, especially the responses of the birth and divorce rates.
This we would explain by the fact that family life and the economic lives of
men and women are more separated today than earlier.
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